A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategyproof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain, is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We investigate the relationship between dictatorial and random dictatorship domains. We show that there exist dictatorial domain...

In social choice settings with strict preferences, random dictatorship rules were characterized by Gibbard [1977] as the only randomized social choice functions that satisfy strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. In the more general domain with indifferences, RSD (random serial dictatorship) rules are the well-known and perhaps only known generalization of random dictatorship. We present a n...

A Boolean function f : {0, 1} → {0, 1} is called a dictator if it depends on exactly one variable i.e f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = xi for some i ∈ [n]. In this work, we study a k-query dictatorship test. Dictatorship tests are central in proving many hardness results for constraint satisfaction problems. The dictatorship test is said to have perfect completeness if it accepts any dictator function. ...

We study the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents without transferable utilities, where each agent may receive more than one object according to a quota. Under lexicographic preferences, we characterize the set of strategyproof, non-bossy, and neutral quota mechanisms and show that under a mild Pareto efficiency condition, serial dictatorship quota mechanisms are the only mechanisms...

In this paper we consider the exogenous indifference classes model of Barberá and Ehlers (2011) and Sato (2009) and analyze further the relationship between the structure of indifference classes across agents and dictatorship results. The key to our approach is the pairwise partition graph. We provide necessary conditions on these graphs for strategy-proofness and unanimity (or efficiency) to i...

There are many situations where the indifference classes of the agents’ preferences are exogenously given. We present a framework for dealing with such situations and find that the cardinality of the set S, which consists of alternatives that every agent ranks strictly, is critical to the construction of a strategyproof social choice function; if |S| ≥ 3, then strategy-proofness implies dictato...

A hypergraph dictatorship test is first introduced by Samorodnitsky and Trevisan in [21] and serves as a key component in their unique games based PCP construction. Such a test has oracle access to a collection of functions and determines whether all the functions are the same dictatorship, or all their low degree influences are o(1). The test in [21] makes q ≥ 3 queries and has amortized query...

In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that retains both properties. RSD has been particularly successful in the special domain of random assign...

Purpose – The paper aims to consider system and control ideas which are useful in analysing problems in human science. Design/methodology/approach – Three arts of dictatorships are considered, namely: dictatorship in a developing country, dictatorship in a developed country and the global dictatorship. The conditions leading to these dictatorships are explained. Findings – Two arts of democraci...

Historically, programming languages have been—although benevolent—dictators: fixing a lot of semantics into built-in language constructs. Over the years, (some) programming languages have freed the programmers from restrictions to use only built-in libraries, built-in data types, or built-in type checking rules. Even though, arguably, such freedom could lead to anarchy, or people shooting thems...