To better understand the competitive dynamics between an early and a later entrant, the present study examines the extent to which word-of-mouth regarding the later entrant and the later entrant’s similarity to the early entrant influences the consumer decision process. The authors hypothesize that the influence of word-of-mouth and similarity depends on the nature of the decision-making task, ...

Machine scheduling problems arise in many production processes, and are something that needs to be consider when optimizing the supply chain. Among them, flowshop happen a number of jobs have sequentially processed by machines. This paper addressees, for first time, Permutation Flowshop Scheduling problem with additional Resources during Setups (PFSR-S). In this problem, addition standard permu...

The aim of this paper is to propose a new particle swarm optimization algorithm to solve a hybrid flowshop scheduling with sequence-dependent setup times problem, which is of great importance in the industrial context. This algorithm is called diversified particle swarm optimization algorithm which is a generalization of particle swarm optimization algorithm and inspired by an anarchic society ...

This paper examines the effect of market-entry timing on a firm’s speed and cost entry in setting where firm needs to build plant for market entry. Based our developed analytical model, we provide seven scenarios cost. We test hypotheses liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry. use Wooldridge’s three-step instrumental variable (IV) approach account endogeneity bias. find that late entrant has (1) ...

Re-entrant manufacturing systems differ from traditional manufacturing systems in the sense that a job may visit a service station more than once, at various stages of the product development cycle. Several parts at different stages of processing may be in contention for service at the same machine, which gives rise to the need to solve scheduling problems. This document surveys some of the fac...

We examine bidding behavior in an open ascending-price auction, without a binding reserve price, in which allocation to a particular bidder imposes a common payoff-reducing externality on the remaining two bidders. An example consists of a “potential entrant” bidding for an innovation against two “incumbents”. The public good aspect to pre-empting the potential entrant is shown to result in two...