We consider a price discrimination problem in which a seller has a single object for sale to a potential buyer. At the time of contracting, the buyer’s private type is his incomplete private information about his value, and the seller can disclose additional private information to the buyer. We study the question of whether discriminatory information disclosure can be profitable to the seller u...

In this study, a new warranty service strategy is proposed and analyzed. This strategy adds the renewing free-replacement warranty to a non-repairable product sold under the rebate warranty policy. According to the renewing free-replacement warranty, the seller (manufacturer) is responsible for replacing all failed product during the warranty period, and the warranty begins anew with each repla...

We examine a setting in which a buyer wishes to purchase probabilistic information from some agent. The seller must invest effort in order to gain access to the information, and must therefore be compensated appropriately. However, the information being sold is hard to verify and the seller may be tempted to lie in order to collect a higher payment. While it is generally easy to design informat...

extension of the building advance-sale contracts on the one hand, and inadequacy of the provisions of the civil code on protection of  building advance-buyers before making its completion, on the other, consequently causing many problems for people in the community (society), has forced the legislature to pass the building advance-sale code in 2010. the parties of these contracts are called adv...

On a “marketplace” platform, where two sides of users trade, the platform owner has an incentive to regulate its marketplace for a higher profit. This study focuses on a monopoly platform’s nonpricing, regulatory strategies in governing quality heterogeneity of competing sellers. In contrast to related studies, we endogenize strategic interactions among platform users. Our model extends the cir...

As the number of ad exchanges has grown, publishers have turned to low regret learning algorithms to decide which exchange offers the best price for their inventory. This in turn opens the following question for the exchange: how to set prices to attract as many sellers as possible and maximize revenue. In this work we formulate this precisely as a learning problem, and present algorithms showi...

In this paper, seller-buyer supply chain coordination with general side-payment contracts is introduced to gain the maximum possible chain profit. In our model, the logistics costs for both buyer and seller are considered and the final demand is also supposed to be a decreasing function of the retail price. Since parties aim to maximize their individual profits, the contractual parameters are s...

In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for why auctioneers often keep the reserve price hidden or secret. We consider a standard independent private values environment in which the buyers are risk-averse and the seller has private information about her valuation of the object to be auctioned. The seller uses a Þrst-price sealed-bid auction mechanism combined with either an announc...

This study analyzes how auction, seller, and product factors influence the price premium in an eBay used car auction market. In auctions with at least one bid, the reputation of the seller, title status, and the time the auction ended influenced the price premium on the highest bid. For auctions that resulted in a sale, cars with clear title and dealers were able to secure significantly greater...