We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the exi...

This paper builds a two-country, two-sector (polluting, nonpolluting) trade model with directed technical change, examining whether unilateral environmental policies can ensure sustainable growth. The polluting good generates more or less emissions depending on its relative use of a clean and a dirty input. I show that a unilateral policy combining clean research subsidies and a trade tax can e...

Predictive maintenance is based on observing an indicator of the state of a system, at different intervals of time which gives the decision maker some information about the exact state. The problem is to obtain an optimal replacement policy minimizing the long run expected cost per unit of time and to formulate it as a partially observable Markov decision process.

As you’ve probably already discovered in your academic and professional lives, the audience for almost everything you write, whether it is a professor, teaching assistant, grant administrator, journal editor, colleague, program administrator, policy-maker, scientist or public health activist, is likely to view your work skeptically. In fact, reader skepticism is likely to increase in direct pro...

This paper studies information transmission between multiple agents with heterogeneous preferences and a welfare maximizing decision maker who chooses the quality or quantity of a public good (e.g. size of a public project; pace of lectures in a classroom; government regulation) that is consumed by all of them. As the number of agents becomes larger, the quality of information transmission dimi...

In this paper we examine the problems facing a policy maker who observes inconsistent choices made by agents who are boundedly rational. We contrast a model-less and a model-based approach to welfare economics. We make the case for the model-based approach and examine its advantages as well as some problematic issues associated with it. J.E.L. codes: B4, D03, D6.

Following the recent literature on make-take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order improve trading quality its platform. To do so, use principal-agent approach, where agents (the makers) optimize their quotes Nash equilibrium fashion, providing best response proposed by principal exchange). This aims at attracting liquidity...