Most of data in Multi-attribute decision making (MADM) problems are changeable rather than constant and stable. Therefore, sensitivity analysis after problem solving can effectively contribute to making accurate decisions. In this paper, we offer a new method for sensitivity analysis in multi-attribute decision making problems in which if the weights of one attribute changes, then we can dete...

This paper builds on previous papers describing our ongoing research in automated market-mechanism design: using a genetic algorithm (GA) to find optimal parameter-settings for softwareagent traders that operate in virtual “e-marketplaces”, where the rules of the marketplaces are also under simultaneous control of the GA. The aim is that the GA automatically designs new agentbased e-marketplace...

In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources (e.g. spectrum resources in wireless communications). Unfortunately, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is always trustworthy in the sealedbid auctions, which is not always true in a more realistic scenario. On the other hand, perfor...

Double auction markets have consistently been shown to realize almost full efficiency and prices very near the theoretical prediction. Research typically focuses on the performance of the double auction in single market environments. However, real economic activity is coordinated across multiple markets, a far more complex task. This paper uses experimental methods to examine the double auction...

This paper proposes a simple descriptive model of discrete-time double auction markets for divisible assets. As in the classical models exchange economies, we consider finite set agents described by their initial endowments and preferences. Instead Walrasian-type market models, however, assume that all trades take place centralized where communicate through sealed limit orders buying selling. W...

We investigate a type of emerging user-assisted mobile applications or services, referred to as Dynamic Mobile Adhoc Crowd Service (DMACS), such as collaborative streaming via smartphones or location privacy protection through a crowd of smartphone users. Such services are provided and consumed by users carrying smart mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) who are in close proximity of each other (...

We show why the failure of the affiliation assumption prevents the double auction from achieving efficient outcomes when values are interdependent. This motivates the study of an ascending price version of the double auction. It is shown that when there is a sufficiently large, but still finite, number of sellers, this mechanism has an approximate perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which traders c...

Following the multistage design approach, we propose two asymptotically efficient truthful double auction mechanisms, the BC-LP mechanism and the MBC mechanism, for an exchange market with many buyers and sellers. In this market, each buyer wants to procure a bundle of commodities and each seller supplies one unit of a commodity. Furthermore, various transaction-related costs will be incurred w...