Conventional (single-prior) Bayesian games of incomplete information are limited in their ability to capture the extent of informational asymmetry. In particular, they are not capable of representing complete ignorance of an uninformed player about an unknown parameter of the environment. Using a framework of contracting for delegated experimentation, we formulate and analyze a dynamic game of ...

Note: This is a only a draft version, so there could be flaws. If you find any errors, please do send email to [email protected]. A more thorough version would be available soon in this space. We have so far studied strategic form games with complete information. We will now study games with incomplete information, which are crucial to the theory of mechanism design. In particular, we stud...

Identification of implicit structures in dynamic systems is a fundamental problem in Artificial Intelligence. In this paper, we focus on General Game Playing where games are modeled as finite state machines. We define a new property of game states called invariant projections which strongly corresponds to humans’ intuition of game boards and may be applied in General Game Playing to support pow...

Abstract We study a strict version of the notion equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (Econometrica 65:1283–1309, 1997) that allows for larger class incomplete information perturbations given complete game, where with high probability, players believe their payoffs are close to (but may be different from) those game. show monotone potential maximizer game is strictly robust if either or a...

Background. Basketball is a dynamic sport where athletes are expected to observe the fast movements of team players and opponents in a performance. This condition requires a collective focus on the stipulated tasks, to achieve peak performance. Besides, training is frequently performed to improve concentration and athlete performance. This instigates the need for technology-based methods, inclu...

The Historical Context John Harsanyi’s (1967; 1968a, b) three-part essay “Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players” should be read today with a view to its place in the history of economic thought. It is one of the great papers that gave birth to modern information economics. Other outstanding papers in this group include William Vickrey’s (1961) paper on auctions, George Ak...

This paper considers a mean–variance portfolio selection problem under partial information, that is, the investor can observe the risky asset price with random drift which is not directly observable in financial markets. Since the dynamic mean–variance portfolio selection problem is time inconsistent, to seek the time-consistent investment strategy, the optimization problem is formulated and ta...

A number of papers have shown that a strict Nash equilibrium action pro ̄le of a game may never be played if there is a small amount of incomplete information (see, for example, Carlsson and van Damme (1993a)). We present a general approach to analyzing the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information. A Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust...