Using an exact replication of the MIT Beer Game, a supply chain simulation was developed in which Intelligent Software Agents manage the supply chain subject to all of the constraints placed on the original human players. The agents’ information processing capabilities are founded on Support Vector Machines (SVM) with an asymmetric cost function, which permits internal modeling of appropriate s...

There are many materials for which the quantity needed by a firm is at best indirectly related to the quantity of final product produced by that firm, such as solvents in manufacturing processes or office supplies. For any such “indirect” materials, an inescapable incentive conflict exists: The buyer wishes to minimize consumption of these indirect materials, while the supplier’s profits depend...

Freight networks are a case of systems that multiple participants are composing interrelations along the complete supply chain. Their interrelations correspond to alternative behavior, namely, cooperation, non-cooperation and competition, while they are large-scale spatially distributed systems combining multiple means of transportation and the infrastructure and equipment typically utilized fo...

T paper investigates the capacity investment decision of a supplier who solicits private forecast information from a manufacturer. To ensure abundant supply, the manufacturer has an incentive to inflate her forecast in a costless, nonbinding, and nonverifiable type of communication known as “cheap talk.” According to standard game theory, parties do not cooperate and the only equilibrium is uni...

This paper presents a discrete network design problem for optimally designing freight transport network in terms of the efficiency of supply chain. Modelling is undertaken within the framework of mathematical programmes with equilibrium constraints, which first incorporates both supply chain and transport networks explicitly. The upper level determines the best set of actions for transport netw...

In this paper, with help of the concept of hyper-rationality, we model the interaction between two investment companies by an important game as trickery game that has special equilibrium which called hyper-equilibrium. In trickery game, one company can choose cooperation with another company until the last moment and finally changes his action to non-cooperation which incur more loss to an oppo...

The main objective of this paper is to provide the reader with a state of the art on the supply chain resilience. Markets globalization and global supply chains have to be regarded as business opportunities of economic development for each supply chain actor, but at the same time, they introduce a number of risks and vulnerabilities that affect the capability of the supply chains to maintain eq...