A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the agg...

The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such a strategy exists. The paper studies an interplay between the distributed knowledge, coalition strategies, and coalition “know-how” strategies. The main technical result is a sound ...

We study the myopic stability of hedonic coalition formation. Myopic stability means that for each unstable coalition structure there exists a sequence of myopic blockings that leads to a stable coalition structure. The main result is a characterization of the hedonic coalition formation models which are myopically stable whenever a stable coalition structure exists. One interesting implication...

The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such a strategy exists. The article studies an interplay between the distributed knowledge, coalition strategies, and coalition “know-how” strategies. The main technical result is a soun...

We add a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic, a popular formalism for reasoning about cooperation in game-like multi-agent systems. The basic constructs of Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) allow us to express such properties as “every coalition satisfying property P can achieve φ” and “there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve φ”. We give ...

Advocacy coalitions often play an important role in the state health policymaking process, yet little is known about their structure, composition, and behavior. In 2008, California became the first state to enact a menu labeling law. Using the advocacy coalition framework, we examine different facets of the coalitions involved in California's menu labeling policy debate. We use a qualitative re...

We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategyproofness (SP) for market design. Conceptually, SP-L requires that an agent who regards a mechanism’s “prices” as exogenous to her report – be they traditional prices as in an auction mechanism, or price-like statistics in an assignmen...

Coalition network-centric operations are a crucial component of future military operations but their success and efficiency is by no means guaranteed and simulation is one powerful technique for assuring this success. The challenges of coalition operations that simulation can address spring from a number of sources, including differences in equipment, differences in training, and differences in...