This paper presents a novel method to evaluate the economic feasibility of Fiber-to-the-Home networks resorting to state-of-the-art techniques. The method presented in this paper is a powerful combination of game theory, advanced capital budgeting algorithms with real options and Monte Carlo simulations with complex statistical distributions to evaluate project risk. Index Terms — FTTH, Game th...

With the increasing demands of consumers for product grade, C2B model high-grade e-commerce emerges as required. In order to solve problem coordination and cooperation between platforms manufacturers, further develop e-commerce, this paper studies supply chain interests by establishing a differential game considering grade factors. By comparing equilibrium solutions games under different decisi...

This paper proposes a bi-level stochastic optimization problem (a Stackelberg game) to generate optimal bids for a profit maximizing hydropower producer and presents a mathematical approach to solve it. The first level represents the strategically acting hydropower producer also called a Stackelberg leader, while the second level represents the transmission system operator (TSO) also called a S...

Defender-Attacker Stackelberg games are the foundations of tools deployed for computing optimal patrolling strategies in adversarial domains such as the United states Federal Air Marshals Service and the United States Coast Guard, among others. In Stackelberg game models of these systems the attacker knows only the probability that each target is covered by the defender, but is oblivious to the...

Many multi-product firms incur a complexity fixed cost when offering different product lines in different quality tiers relative to the case when offering all products lines in the same quality tier (high or low). Such fixed costs create an interdependency between firms’choices of quality tiers across different product lines, even when demands are independent. We investigate the effects of this...

How should agents shape a finite “reputational" history to their advantage knowing that others will be learning from that history? We focus on one leader interacting with multiple followers and show that in most non-zero-sum games, the traditional Stackelberg mixed commitment is very fragile to observational uncertainty. We propose robust commitment rules that anticipate being learned and show ...

This paper investigates the emission reduction performance for supply chain members in both single-channel and exclusive dual-channel cases. Two game scenarios (Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg) are examined under different channel structures. Furthermore, we introduce government subsidies as an impact factor of low-carbon strategy adoption. In the single-channel (Case 1), we m...

Let G(V,E) be a directed graph with n vertices and m edges. The edges E of G are divided into two types: EF and EP . Each edge of EF has a fixed price. The edges of EP are the priceable edges and their price is not fixed a priori. Let r be a vertex of G. For an assignment of prices to the edges of EP , the revenue is given by the following procedure: select a shortest path tree T from r with re...

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders play and choose their actions based on their information about the system and the followers choose their actions myopically according to their observations of ...