We present a prototype tool for automated reasoning for Coalition Logic, a non-normal modal logic that can be used for reasoning about cooperative agency. The theorem prover CLProver is based on recent work on a resolution-based calculus for Coalition Logic that operates on coalition problems, a normal form for Coalition Logic. We provide an overview of coalition problems and of the resolutionb...

Low voltage distribution grids play an important role in the energy transition—both generation and demand. In coming decades reliability of these may deteriorate due to asset ageing. Various maintenance (replacement) strategies are compared order mitigate this. For multiple scenarios, it is analysed under which circumstances when alternative more profitable than current practice towards managin...

We formulate the problem of distributed throughput-efficient sensing in cognitive radio (CR) networks as a dynamic coalition formation game based on a Markovian model. The proposed coalition formation enables the CRs to increase their achievable throughput, under the detection probability constraint, while also taking into account the overhead in sensing reports combining. The dynamic model of ...

The two main questions in coalition games are 1) what coalitions should form and 2) how to distribute the value of each coalition between its members. When a game is not superadditive, other coalition structures (CSs) may be more attractive than the grand coalition. For example, if the agents care about the total payoff generated by the entire society, CSs that maximize utilitarian social welfa...

This paper reinterprets the γ -core (Chander and Tulkens in Int Tax Pub Financ 2:279–293, 1995; in Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. The problem of coalition formation is formulated as an infinitely repeated game in which the players must choose whether to co...

The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, ta...

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there i...

In a dynamic coalition environment, it is essential to allow automatic sharing of resources among coalition members. The challenge is to facilitate such sharing while adhering to the security policies of each coalition. To accomplish this, a dynamic coalition-based access control (DCBAC) has been proposed earlier, where security policies enforced by each coalition member are published in a cent...

In this paper we address the problem of coalition formation in hedonic context. Our modelling tries to be as realistic as possible. In previous models, once an agent joins a coalition it would not be able to leave the coalition and join the new one; in this research we made it possible to leave a coalition but put some restrictions to control the behavior of agents. Leaving or staying of an age...