Abstract This paper proposes a generalization of Shleifer’s (RAND J Econ 16:319–327, 1985) model yardstick competition to dynamic framework. In differential game setting, we show that the mechanism effectively replicates first-best solution if players adopt open-loop behaviour rules and are symmetric at initial time; in absence symmetry, social efficiency is reached only asymptotic steady state...

The Japanese nominative particle ga can mark a subject, a possessor of a subject, an adjunct and the object of a stative predicate. A prevalent view is that a tensed head licenses more than one nominative phrase in multiple specifier or adjoined positions in one projection (Heycock 1993, Ura 1996, among others). I argue, however, that such a head licenses exactly one nominative phrase and that ...

We study mechanism design for a single server setting where jobs require compensation for waiting, while waiting cost is private information to the jobs. With given priors on the private information of jobs, we aim to find a Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanism that minimizes the total expected payments to the jobs. Following earlier work in the auction literature, we show that this proble...

Several game forms are given for implementing general social choice correspondences (SCC,' s) which satisfy Haskin' s conditions of monotonicity and No Veto Power. The game forms have smaller strategy spaces than those used in previously discovered mechanisms: the strategy for an individual consists of an alternative, two subsets (of alternatives), and a player number. For certain types of econ...

In the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, we present a bargaining mechanism for connecting all agents to the source and dividing the cost amongst them. The basic idea is very simple: we ask each agent the part of the cost he is willing to pay for an arc to be constructed. We prove that there exists a unique payoff allocation associated with the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of th...