In a principal-agent environment with moral hazard, when contracting occurs after the principal receives information about her technology, the principal cannot insure against the possibility that the technology is less informative. From an ex ante perspective, we show that: (i) the principal is worse off by acquiring private information if the agent will know that she is informed; (ii) the valu...

We consider algorithms for the principal-agent problem in an online setting, where a principal seeks to offer the smallest possible reward that will motivate an agent to perform an action beneficial to the principal. This is an especially challenging problem because the principal does not directly observe the agent’s dislike for the action. We reproduce some results of Conitzer and Garera [3], ...

This paper introduces asymmetric awareness into the classical principal-agent model and discusses the optimal contract between a fully aware principal and an unaware agent. The principal enlarges the agent’s awareness strategically when proposing the contract. He faces a trade off between participation and incentives. Leaving the agent unaware allows him to exploit the agent’s incomplete unders...

This paper studies the multi-factory production (MFP) network scheduling problem where a number of different individual factories join together to form a MFP network, in which these factories can operate more economically than operating individually. However, in such network which known as virtual production network with self-interested factories with transportation times, each individual facto...

This paper reports on the development of a unique software prototype that combines digital information spaces with sound and intelligent agent support. This prototype is innovative in its use of digital space as a mechanism for arranging image based information for presentation scenarios. Working with a spatial approach to digital environments, this research presents the prototype, and examines...

A principal delegates R&D to an agent when the researcher’s actions are unobservable. The optimal contract for delegated R&D is shown to take the form of an option. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the agent is subject to limited liability. The principal makes an implementation decision after observing the quality of the invention. The discussion considers experimental design wi...

This paper presents a multi agent system for the job shop scheduling problems. The proposed system consists of initial scheduling agent, search agents, and schedule management agent. In initial scheduling agent, a modified Shifting Bottleneck is proposed. That is, an effective heuristic approach and can generate a good solution in a low computational effort. In search agents, a hybrid search ap...

We explore the potential for discriminating between honest and dishonest agents, when a principal faces an agent with private information about the circumstances of the exchange (good or bad). When honest agents reveal circumstances truthfully independently of the contract offered, the principal leaves a rent only to dishonest agents (even if honest agents are willing to lie about their ethics)...

This paper studies a principal-agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent. We show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space, and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal, biased toward the agent’s...