This study uses hearing transcripts to examine judge-defendant interaction in a trial-type setting. The setting is a public housing eviction hearing; judges are eviction board members and defendants are tenants facing eviction for non-payment of rent. All tenants in the sample were formally evicted, but in each case the execution of the eviction order was stayed on the condition that the tenant...

This paper develops and applies a method for producing constant quality rent indexes and inflation estimates for different segments of the rental housing stock. In each of the five contrasting metropolitan areas, rent inflation since the late 1980s is found to have varied by market segment. In some metro areas, rental prices have risen most rapidly in the bottom third of the rent distribution, ...

Resource provisioning in Cloud providers is a challenge because of the high variability of load over time. On the one hand, the providers can serve most of the requests owning only a restricted amount of resources, but this forces to reject customers during peak hours. On the other hand, valley hours incur in under-utilization of the resources, which forces the providers to increase their price...

For the development and evaluation of new algorithms, architectures and technologies, a huge amount of benchmark circuits with suitable characteristic parameters are required. Synthetic circuits are a viable alternative to real circuits for compiling benchmark suites. A major advantage of synthetic benchmark circuits is that full control of the important parameters is provided. In this paper, a...

O¢ cial Development Aid ‡ows are volatile, non-predictable and, also, nontransparent. All these features give rise to asymmetric information about the amount of aid ‡ows received by developing countries. This article uses a political economy model of rent extraction to show how this asymmetry (i) encourages rent extraction by kleptocratic regimes, thus reducing aid e¢ ciency, and (ii) increases...

We study the optimal contracts (payment and extraction path) implemented by a regulator that delegates the production of a nonrenewable resource to a firm which has private information on costs (constant efficiency parameter). We assume the regulator is unable to commit and show that the standard contract that only distorts the inefficient firm’s production and leaves the efficient one with an ...