This paper reports the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects are offered contracts structured like equity compensation packages, which result in subjects receiving cash payments that are a function of their effort and random factors. We compare the experimental outcomes from alternative contractual forms to theoretical benchmarks and report the efficiency of the contracts to provi...

This paper analyses how contractual arrangements for the sale and resale of premium programming affect competition in the pay-TV market. Competition is less effective when resale contracts specify per-subscriber fees rather than lump-sum payments. When premium programming is sold at terms similar to those observed in the UK, consumers can be made worse off than in the absence of premium program...

In this paper,a coordination model has been investigated for a two-level supply chain (SC) consisting of one retailer and one supplier under periodic review inventory system. The review period and the retailer’s safety factorare assumed to be decision variables. The retailer faces stochastic demand following a normal distribution with known mean and variance. Moreover, it is assumed that unmet ...

extension of the building advance-sale contracts on the one hand, and inadequacy of the provisions of the civil code on protection of  building advance-buyers before making its completion, on the other, consequently causing many problems for people in the community (society), has forced the legislature to pass the building advance-sale code in 2010. the parties of these contracts are called adv...

How do markets spread risk when events are unknown or unknowable and where not anticipated in an insurance contract? While the policyholder can “hold up” the insurer for extra contractual payments, the continuing gains from trade on a single contract are often too small to yield useful coverage. By acting as a repository of the reputations of the parties, we show the brokers provide a coordinat...

This paper investigates the equilibrium consequences of a contractual market with moral hazard where multiple principals compete each other to offer incentive contracts to agents who choose unobservable ex post actions. We show the following limit theorems: First, when the trade–off between incentive and risk sharing causes the moral hazard problem on the side of agents, the full insurance cont...

We study the incentive issues associated with self-enforcing stochastic monitoring in a model of investment and production. The e¢ cient contract features a debt-like payment with a threshold in terms of the reported output in which all of the reported output is taken up to the threshold if monitoring doesn’t occur and all of the output is taken if monitoring does occur. An output report above ...

We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon. Under a backlogging model, we show that the manufacturer’s optimal dynamic long-term contract takes a simple form: in the first period, based on her private demand forecast, the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee, and, from then o...

The ‘minimal’ payment—a payment method which minimizes the number of coins in a purse—is presented. We focus on a time series of change given back to a shopper repeating the minimal payment. The delay plot shows visually that the set of successive change possesses a fine structure similar to the Sierpinski gasket. We also estimate effectivity of the minimal-payment method by means of the averag...

The article examines the need for a treasury information system in public finance management digital economy and importance of using software packages execution budget. analysis off-budget funds on accounts higher educational institutions Republic Uzbekistan received from contract form education is carried out. provides scientific proposals practical recommendations improving accounting payment...