New relaxations of the Nash equilibrium concept are shown to exist in any strategic game with discontinuous payoff functions. The new concepts are used (1) to show the equivalence between Reny’s better-reply security condition [28] and Simon-Zame’s endogenous tie-breaking rule equilibrium concept [32], (2) to obtain conditions for the existence of approximated equilibria in a class of discontin...

The Maskin’s theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we propose that if agents report messages to the designer through channels (e.g., Internet), agents can construct a self-enforcing agreement such that any Pareto-inefficient social choice rule satisfying monotonicity and no-veto will not be Nash implementable when an additional condition is satisfied. T...

In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players' voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal-making rule such that this division represents players' expected payoffs ...

We identify how to share costs locally in weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions to minimize the worst-case price of anarchy (POA). First, we prove that among all cost-sharing methods that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the Shapley value minimizes the worst-case POA. Second, if the guaranteed existence condition is dropped, then the proportional cost-sharing ...

Non-coordinated monetary policy is analysed in a stochastic two-country general equilibrium model. Non-coordinated equilibria are compared in two cases: one where policy is set in terms of state-contingent money supply rules and one where policy is set in terms of state-contingent nominal interest rate rules. In general the non-coordinated equilibrium differs between the two types of policy rul...

We introduce Real Candidacy Games (RCGs)—a novel strategic candidacy model, where candidates have a continuous range of positions that affect their attractiveness for voters. We also allow candidates to have their own non-trivial preferences over the candidate set. We study RCGs with restricted and unrestricted positioning strategies to establish conditions for Nash Equilibrium (NE) existence. ...

This paper introduces the concept of firm belief, which is proposed as a new epistemic model for a wide class of preferences. In particular, firm beliefs are shown to have the following desirable properties: (i) they are derived from preferences according to a plausible rule of epistemic inference; (ii) they satisfy standard logical properties; and (iii) tractable representations of firm belief...

We study the problem of dissolving an equal-entitlement partnership when the objective is to minimize maximum regret. We initially focus on the family of linear-pricing mechanisms and derive regret-optimizing strategies. We also demonstrate that there exist linear-pricing mechanisms satisfying ex-post efficiency. Next, we analyze a binary-search mechanism which is ex-post individually rational....