We provide a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker with a given utility function is Choquet rational : She maximizes expected utility, but possibly with respect to non-additive beliefs, so that her preferences are represented by Choquet expected utility (CEU). The characterization shows that this notion of rationality allows in general to rationalize more ...

Gender inequality starts before birth. Parents tend to prefer boys over girls, which is manifested in reproductive behavior, marital life, and parents’ pastimes and investments in their children. While social media and sharing information about children (so-called “sharenting”) have become an integral part of parenthood, it is not well-known if and how gender preference shapes online behavior o...

This study studies the role of hidden curriculum on educational function of students in 2011-2012. It also studies the hidden curriculum (social setting) on educational function among high- school students in Nayshabour. This research is descriptive and inferential. It also uses Halpean craft questionnaire and the validity shows 88%. 290 students were selected. Social settings of high schools i...

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This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable. The lower bound is derived when there are three alternatives to choose from. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. We conjecture that these examples are in fact all minimally manipulable social choice functions. Since some of th...

We characterize the class of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions as integer solutions to a collection of linear inequalities. Many of the known results about impossibility, Arrovian Social Welfare Functions, properties of the majority rule etc., can be derived in a simple and unified way from this integer program. We characterize those preference domains that admit a non-dictatorial, neutral Arro...