This paper analyzes an informal financial institution that brings heterogeneous agents together in groups. We analyze decentralized matching into these groups, and the equilibrium composition of participants that consequently arises. We find that participants sort remarkably well across the competing groups, and that they re-sort immediately following an unexpected exogenous regulatory change. ...

Do political elites use armed groups to foster civilian participation in genocidal violence? Are employed strategically? How do they mobilize civilians? I investigate these questions using data from the Rwandan Genocide. To establish causality, exploit exogenous variation groups’ transport costs induced by weather fluctuations: shortest distance of each village main road interacted with rainfal...

We examine a new dataset of public procurement laws, practice, and outcomes in 187 countries. measure regulation as restrictions on the discretion procuring entities. find that laws practice are highly correlated with each other across countries, better is outcomes, but themselves not outcomes. A closer look shows stricter correlate improved only countries low sector capacity. present model whi...

Corrupt government hiring is common in developing countries. This paper uses original data to document the operation and consequences of corrupt a health bureaucracy. Hires pay bribes averaging 17 months salary, but contrary conventional wisdom, their observable quality comparable counterfactual merit-based hires. Exploiting variation across jobs, I show that allocations depend on correlation b...

This paper analyzes the connection between informal insurance institutions in rural Africa and the adoption of new technologies. We model two linked games — a community risk-sharing game and an old-age insurance game — and analyze the multiple equilibria that arise. We provide a numerical example that indicates that informal insurance institutions may put a downward pressure on the adoption of ...

Can research findings change political leaders’ beliefs and policies? We use experiments with 2,150 Brazilian municipalities to measure mayors’ demand for response information. In one experiment, we find that mayors are willing pay learn the results of evaluation studies, update their when informed findings. They value larger-sample studies more, while not distinguishing between in rich poor co...

This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. To examine how reduced affects citizens’ participation we employ two exogenous shocks vulnerability. First, designed randomized control trial reduce household vulnerability: our development intervention constructed residential water cisterns drought-pro...

Management matters for firms, but what practices are optimal in hierarchical government organizations? And can skilled managers identify them? A large-scale randomized trial conducted with the police of Rajasthan, India, tested four interventions recommended by senior officers: limitations transfers, rotation duties and days off, increased community involvement, on-duty training. Field experien...