This paper investigates the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on CEO compensation, using panel data constructed for the S&P 1500 firms on CEO compensation, financial returns, and reported accounting income. Empirically SOX (i) changes the relationship between a firm’s abnormal returns and CEO compensation, (ii) changes the underlying distribution of abnormal returns, and (iii) significant...

In response to the corporate scandals in 2001-2002, the major U.S. exchanges came up with new regulations which are intended to enhance board oversight. We use this regulation event to shed light on the effect of board oversight on CEO compensation. We find that firms that were not complying with these regulations decreased their CEO compensation by between 20%-25% upon compliance, compared to ...

We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and, in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (retu...

A common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest, publicly traded U. S. companies, we document a strong relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options. In addition, we ...

We examine whether CEO power can explain the vast amount defined benefit pensions received by them. Analyzing a sample of UK firms from 2003 to 2006, we find that pensions constitutes of almost 15% of the average CEO compensation. Statistical analysis shows that the variables representing increased CEO power have a positive influence on pension pay. We also find that the presence of defined ben...

A common view is that there is little correlation between Žrm performance and CEO pay. Using a new Žfteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest, publicly traded U. S. companies, we document a strong relationship between Žrm performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options. In addition, we sho...

Illusory correlation refers to the use of information in decisions that is uncorrelated with the relevant criterion. We document illusory correlation in CEO compensation decisions by demonstrating that information, that is uncorrelated with corporate performance, is related to CEO compensation. We use publicly available data from the USA for the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 to examine the r...

The arrival of spring means yet another round in the national debate over executive compensation. But the critics have it wrong. The relentless attention on how much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real problem-how CEOs are paid. The authors present an in-depth statistical analysis of executive compensation. The study incorporates data on thousands of CEOs spanning five decades....

This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and CEO pay levels and the extent to which the higher pay found in firms using compensation consultants is related to governance differences. Using proxy statement disclosures from 2,110 companies, we find that CEO pay is higher in firms with weaker governance and that firms with weaker governance are more likely to use compensat...