I provide a typology of social capital, breaking it down into seven more fundamental forms of capital: information capital, brokerage capital, coordination and leadership capital, bridging capital, favor capital, reputation capital, and community capital. I discuss how most of these forms of social capital can be identified using different network-based measures. JEL Classification Codes: D85, ...

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links. Since a network describes the interaction structure between agents, our allocation rule covers both bilateral and multilateral interactions. We provide a characterization of this rule in terms of well known axioms and compare it to other allocation rules in the literature. JEL classifications: A14; ...

Galeotti et al. (2006, [2]) show that all minimal networks can be strict Nash in two-way flow models with full parameter heterogeneity while only inward pointing stars and the empty network can be strict Nash in the homogeneous parameter model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]). In this note we show that the introduction of partner heterogeneity plays a major role in substantially increasing the set...

In this paper, we examine the role played by heterogeneity in the connection model. In sharp contrast to the homogeneous cases we show that under heterogeneity involving only two degrees of freedom, all networks can be supported as Nash or efficient. Moreover, we show that there does not always exist Nash networks. However, we show that on reducing heterogeneity, both the earlier “anything goes...

For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed. JEL Classification Numbers C72 · D85

The paper discusses the important role of clustering in the evolution of social networks, as it affects not only the incentives of players to cooperate but also their ability to search for fresh opportunities. Depending on the volatility of the environment and the social convention in place, we show that network clustering endogenously adapts to achieve and maintain, to the extent possible, a s...

Galeotti et al. (2006, [2]) show that all minimal networks can be strict Nash in two-way flow models with full parameter heterogeneity while only inward pointing stars and the empty network can be strict Nash in the homogeneous parameter model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]). In this note we show that the introduction of partner heterogeneity plays a major role in substantially increasing the set...

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links and characterizes it for a fixed network. Unlike previous rules, our characterization does not require component additivity. Next, we extend it to flexible networks à la Jackson (2005). Finally, we provide a comparison with other fixed (network Myerson and Position value) and flexible network (player...

We present a model of communication network formation in which links’ strengths are endogenously determined by individual incentives. Agents are endowed with a fixed amount of resource which they can distribute as they want in directed links. Individuals capture benefits from both direct and indirect access to others, in a way that takes into account the strength of each link. The wheel archite...

We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Moreover, our existence proof allows us to characterize a pairwise equilibrium of thes...