We start with an unknown binary n×m matrix, where the entries correspond to the preferences of n users on m items. The goal is to find at least one item per user that the user likes, with as few queries as possible. Since there are matrices where any algorithm performs badly without any preliminary knowledge of the input matrix, we reveal an anonymized version of the input matrix to the algorit...

Most prominent models of economic justice (and especially those proposed by Harsanyi and Rawls) are based on the assumption that impartiality is required for making moral decisions. However, although Harsanyi and Rawls agree on that, and furthermore agree on the fact that impartiality can be obtained under appropriate conditions of ignorance, they strongly disagree on the consequences of these ...

Abstract. The classical problem of the monopolist faced with an unknown demand curve is considered in a simple stochastic setting. Sequential pricing strategies designed to maximize discounted profits are shown to converge sufficiently rapidly that they leave the monopolist ignorant about all but the most local features of demand. The failure of the monopolist to “learn” his demand curve would ...

Oblivious transfer (OT) is a two-party primitive which is one of the cornerstones of modern cryptography. We focus on providing information-theoretic security for both parties, hence building OT assuming noisy resources (channels or correlations) available to them. This primitive is about transmitting two strings such that the receiver can obtain one (and only one) of them, while the sender rem...

Influence Diagrams ( I D S ) are a graphic formal ism able to provide a compact representation of decision problems. IDs are based on the axioms of probabi l i ty and decision theory, and they define a normat ive framework to model decision mak ing . Unfor tunate ly , IDs require a large amount of in fo rmat ion that is not always available to the decision maker. Th is paper in troduces a new c...

A principal-agent model is considered in which the principal decides how much private information to acquire before making an offer to the agent (e.g., an insurer decides whether to gather information about the risk status of a potential client through medical testing before offering the client a policy). I prove in a general environment that there is a nontrivial set of parameters for which it...