Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even loca...

This paper compares the leader and follower payoffs in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoffs in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players’ payoffs are monotonic in the opponent’s choice along their own best reply function, then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff, or lower than even...

This paper is concernedwith a leader–follower stochastic differential gamewith asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-σ -algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of game problem has wide applications in finance, economics and management engineering such as newsvendor problems, cooperative advertising and pricing problems. Stochasti...

This study considers pricing, production and transportation decisions in a Stackelberg game between three-stage, multi-product, multi-source and single-period supply chains called leader and follower. These chains consist of; manufacturers, distribution centers (DCs) and retailers. Competition type is horizontal and SC vs. SC. The retailers in two chains try to maximize their profit through pri...

Bayesian Stackelberg games have been used to compute optimal patrol strategies for the security of the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) by modelling the security situation as a 1-leader, 1-follower, Bayesian game where there is one leader type and an arbitrary number of follower types. A previous approach, named DOBSS, computes the Stackelberg solution for this game by solving a Mixed In...

This paper deals with the leader-follower formation control problem while communication constraint in data transmitting is considered. From a practical point of view, we study the case in which unmanned vehicles are subject to the limited sensing, and communication is of a particular interest. A three-dimensional formation flight of multi-unmanned aerial vehicles with leader-follower configurat...

The noncooperative multi-leader-follower game can be formulated as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem where each player solves a nonconvex mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. Two major deficiencies exist with such a formulation: One is that the resulting Nash equilibrium may not exist, due to the nonconvexity in each player’s problem; the other is that such a nonconvex Nash g...

The multi-leader-follower game can be looked on as a generalization of the Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), which contains several leaders and followers. Recently, the multi-leader-follower game has been drawing more and more attention, for example, in power markets. On the other hand, in such real-world problems, uncertainty normally exists and sometimes cannot simply be ignored. To handle math...

We consider a Stackelberg game in a network, where a leader minimizes the cost of interdicting arcs and a follower seeks the shortest distance between given origin and destination nodes under uncertain arc traveling cost. In particular, we consider a risk-averse leader, who aims to keep high probability that the follower’s traveling distance is longer than a given threshold, interpreted by a ch...