This paper studies how amatching rule affects the evolution of fairness in the ultimatumgame. Gale et al. [1995] show that under the randommatching rule, a partially fair imperfect Nash equilibrium in which all proposers are fair but some responders are selfish is asymptotically stable in the limit as noise in learning vanishes if responders are noisier than proposers. This paper shows that, un...

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the agents. We examine computational and non-computational aspects of strategising under the PS rule. Firstly, we study the computational complexity of an agent manip...

Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) have shown that if players' beliefs about the future evolution of play is absolutely continuous with respect to play induced by optimal strategies then Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we present the ̄rst set of necessary and su±cient conditions that ensure that Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. More important...

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts, which we term ‘overspreading.’ In a 2 × 2 design, we investigate the effects of allocating the prize by...

If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals’ preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of ‘‘welfare optima’’. A game form (or ‘‘mechanism’’) implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (i) any welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game for...

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper o§ers a compl...

We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. While the results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature, the situation is di¤erent in the case of Nash implementation. We …nd that the union of any set of N...

This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a twoplayer contest with a general contest success function. The timing of moves, determined in a pre-play stage prior to the contest-subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following. (1) Players ...

] proposed a classical algorithm to break through Maskin's theorem for the case of many agents. In this paper, we will give two examples to break through the aforementioned results on two-agent Nash implementation by virtue of Wu's algorithm. There are two main contributions of this paper: 1) A two-player social choice rule (SCR) that satisfies Condition µ2 cannot be Nash implemented if an addi...