introduction: market power is an important factor affecting welfare. existence of market power on the purchase side reduces supplier welfare. however, existence of market power on the sales side reduces supplier welfare. some believe that the agricultural market structure is a monopoly. in fact, most of the agricultural products can be purchased by small firms and then delivered to consumers be...

This paper presents an empirical assessment of the degree of competition within the Jamaican banking sector during the period 1998 to 2009. We employ a dynamic version of the Panzar Rosse Model to estimate market power among the sample of banks that constitute over 90 percent of the banking market. Using the conventional statistical tests, we are unable to reject monopoly/perfect collusion for ...

earnings management has inverted the main objective of financial reporting through the distortion of the actual economic performance of companies and prevented the complete transfer of information to market. given the importance of subject of research, incentives that cause earnings management have been reviewed from various aspects. the main purpose of this research is to examine the relations...

Models formulated as complementarity problems have been applied previously to assess the potential for market power in transmission-constrained electricity markets. Here, we use the complementarity approach to simulate the interaction of pollution permit markets with electricity markets, considering forward contracts and the operating reserve market. Because some power producers are relatively ...

In this paper, we propose an oligopolistic model of electricity market of Mexico and analyze numerical experiments based upon this model. Presently, the Mexican electricity market is presented by the state-regulated monopoly, so a competition market is not yet established. Our work can be evaluated as an empirical study of possible liberalization effects for Mexico. An oligopolistic market stru...

Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi-product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, price coordination incentives tradeoff with effort incentives. This makes some intra-firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi-product firms allow for competition b...