The separation of ownership and control in corporations opens up the potential for moral hazard. Thus it is conventional wisdom that managers who are not closely monitored pursue personal goals rather then maximize shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about what these goals are, despite the importance of understanding manager behavior when designing corporate governance rules. This paper pro...

This paper focuses on the inter-relationship between corporate governance, financing of corporate growth and stock market development in emerging countries. It explores both theoretically and empirically the nature of the interrelationships between these phenomena, as well as their implications for economic policy. It concentrates on how corporate growth is financed, an area where the literatur...

Background: This study investigates whether state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Indonesia implement stronger corporate governance than do non-SOEs. It can be argued that as a large dedicated institutional investor, the Indonesian government has an incentive to strengthen corporate governance in SOEs and possesses the ability to bear the cost of implementing stronger governance. Research Methods: ...

Using Panel Data methods, this paper examines the impact of institutional investors on corporate governance and corporate performance, based on samples of familial listed companies in China from 2006 to 2008. The research shows that after investing in familial listed companies, institutional investors would play an important role to improve corporate governance. Simultaneously, the proportion o...

This paper explores the role of corporate governance in the Asian crisis countries: Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. It argues that the focus in an analysis of corporate governance should be on the provision of external equity finance -the position of outside minority shareholders. The proportion of equity finance in the capital structure of firms is highly correlated with the status of...

The separation of ownership and control in corporations opens up the potential for moral hazard. Thus it is conventional wisdom that managers who are not closely monitored pursue personal goals rather than maximize shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about what these goals are, despite the importance of understanding manager behavior when designing corporate governance rules. This paper pro...

We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test our predictions using novel executive compensation contract data, and find that firms with more shar...

The efficiency of corporate governance is reflected by the performance of a company, which means corporate governance has the positive and negative effects on the performance of this company. Based on the discussion of the theoretical basis of governance efficiency, this paper takes the listed company with management buyout (MBO) in China as samples and makes an empirical analysis of their gove...

Article history: Received 27 April 2011 Received in revised form 30 November 2011 Accepted 30 November 2011 Available online 8 December 2011 Better corporate governance can reduce the scope for increasing shareholder value and thus discourage M&A FDI inflows. Sound governance may also discourage non-M&A FDI inflows in light of the complementary relationship between M&A and non-M&A FDI. We use f...