Mobile cloud computing is arising as a prominent domain that is seeking to bring the massive advantages of the cloud to the resource constrained smartphones, by following a delegation or offloading criteria. In a delegation model, a mobile device consumes services from multiple clouds by following their Web API. In the offloading model, a mobile application is partitioned and analyzed so that t...

This paper contributes to the literature on optimal delegation, dating back to Holmstrom’s (1984) seminal work. In contrast to models in the Holmstrom tradition, we assume that the set of states is finite. We provide a full characterization of the class of optimal delegation sets under this assumption, and show that they have a different structure from that in the continuous-state model. As the...

In this paper, we investigate some economic fundamentals related to the Tezos blockchain platform under Emmy* consensus protocol. The protocol is based on a liquid version of Proof-of-Stake, in sense that users can temporarily delegate or all their Tz units full nodes. addition increasing stake node, and thus probability being selected as block baker/endorser, such delegation induces property s...

In this paper, we present a novel approach to delegation in computer systems. We exploit mobile code capabilities of today’s systems to build active certificates: cryptographically signed mobile agents that implement delegation policy. Active certificates arrive at a new combination of properties, including expressivity, transparency, and offline operation, that is not available in existing sys...

This paper presents a model for delegation based on partial orders, proposing the subclass relation in OWL as a way to represent the partial orders. Delegation and authorization decisions are made based on the context. In order to interact with the context, we define the Type of a credential as a way to introduce extra information regarding context constraints. When reasoning about delegation a...

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game : Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players settings. We set up two experiments varying in the exogeneity of the delegation relationship. The experime...

We analyze delegation of monetary policy to an independent but accountable Central Banker (CB) in a setting with a dynamic Phillips curve. The paper describes a mechanism that resolves the government's time inconsistency problem. Our proposal closely resembles real-world institutional arrangements and delivers credible implementation of the social optimum by giving dynamic incentives to the CB....

A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent’s preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms – those which maximize the principal’s payoff against the worst agent preference type. These mechanisms are characterized by a property I call “aligned delegation.” In an aligned delegation m...

This paper studies optimal production subsidy in a mixed duopoly with separation between ownership and management. Although many existing literature shows that the first best production allocation is achieved under several economic environments (so-called irrelevance result), we find that this result holds in the following two cases. (1) The owners simultaneously/sequentially decide their sales...

Multiple inheritance is still a controversial feature in traditional object-oriented languages, as evidenced by its omission from such languages as Modula-3, Objective C and JavaTM. Nonetheless, users of such languages often complain about having to work around the absence of multiple inheritance. Automating delegation, in combination with a multiple subtyping mechanism, provides many of the sa...