LAMININ 5 REGULATES POLYCYSTIC KIDNEYS CELL PROLIFERATION AND CYST FORMATION Dominique Joly, Sophie Berissi, Amélie Bertrand, Laetitia Strehl, Natacha Patey and Bertrand Knebelmann. From Université Paris-Descartes, Faculté de Médecine ; Inserm U813; AP-HP Hôpital Necker-Enfants-Malades, Paris, France Address correspondance to : Bertrand KNEBELMANN, Department of Nephrology, Hôpital Necker-Enfan...

This paper shows that the cost as well as the effectiveness of technology has a differential impact on technology adoption under two alternative modes of competition. If the cost of the technology is high, Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt technology than Cournot competition unless the effectiveness of the technology is very low. On the contrary, if the cost of the tec...

Recent experiments suggest that games where actions are strategic substitutes rather than strategic complements exhibit some desirable performance characteristics. This paper reports an experiment conducted to test whether these characteristics extend to differentiated product Cournot and Bertrand markets. We find that Cournot markets do not generally outperform Bertrand markets, and that the o...

The Bertrand paradox question is: “Consider a unit-radius circle for which the length of a side of an inscribed equilateral triangle equals 3 . Determine the probability that the length of a ‘random’ chord of a unit-radius circle has length greater than 3 .” Bertrand derived three different ‘correct’ answers, the correctness depending on interpretation of the word, random. Here we employ geomet...

Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Revisited by Jim Y. Jin This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria with mixed products, linear demand and cost functions. It is found that a firm's price (output) need not be higher (lower) in Cournot equilibrium. However, given any number of firms and a mixture of complement and substitute products, every firm's price margin/output ratio is al...

Incentives and Welfare Effect of Sharing Firm-Specific Information by Jim Y. Jin* This paper studies the incentives and the welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information in asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with mixed substitute and complement goods. Revealing firm-specific cost information is the dominant strategy in Cournot oligopoly, while concealing is so in Bertrand oligopoly...

In this article we revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition in the presence of a cartel of firms that faces outsiders acting individually. This competition setting enables to deal with both non-cooperative and cooperative oligopoly games. We concentrate on industries consisting of symmetrically differentiated products where firms operate at a constant and identica...

Consider a Bertrand model in which each rm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active rms is uncertain. This activity level can be endogenized in any of several ways{ as whether to incur a xed cost of activity, as output choice, or as quality choice. Our model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which industry pro ts are positive and decline with the number of rms, the s...