Different scoring rules can result in the selection of any of the k competing candidates, given the same preference profile, Saari (2001). It is also possible that a candidate, and even a Condorcet winning candidate, cannot be selected by any scoring rule, Saari (2000). These findings are balanced by Saari’s result (1992) that specifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the selection o...

We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the axiom of self-consistent monotonicity. The class of win-loss combining scoring procedures is introduced which contains a majority of known scoring procedures. Tw...

abstract background: heat is one of the most important of harmful agents in many working environments such as bakeries that can cause prevalence of diseases related to heat and falling of efficiency. aim of this study was exposure evaluation of isfahan bakers to heat stresses in their working environment through evaluation of relationship among wet bulb globe temperature index (wbgt) , oral tem...

We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the axiom of self-consistent monotonicity. The class of win-loss combining scoring procedures is introduced which contains a majority of known scoring procedures. Tw...

We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the axiom of self-consistent monotonicity. The class of win-loss combining scoring procedures is introduced which contains a majority of known scoring procedures. Tw...