We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Moreover, our existence proof allows us to characterize a pairwise equilibrium of thes...

Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results prov...

We present a model of directed communication network with endogenous link strength. Agents are endowed with a fixed amount of resource which they can distribute over links. They obtain indirect benefit by the path maximizing the product of link strength. In this environment, the wheel architecture is shown to be not only the unique efficient architecture but also the unique Nash architecture. J...

We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium de…nitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of de…nitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are po...

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first characterize both dominant and dominated equilibria. Second, we examine the issue of social coordination ...

This paper uses a mechanism design framework to characterize how an intermediary can design profit-maximizing matching markets when agents have private information about their quality. When match surpluses are supermodular, sufficient conditions are provided that ensure positive assortative matching is profit maximizing. Under these conditions, two-sided position auctions are characterized that...

We study a resource constrained assembly line balancing problem (RCALBP) presented by Ağpak and Gökçen, who developed a 0-1 integer programming model to find the optimal solution. However, this model is inefficient in solving large-scale problems. In this paper, we propose a simple efficient heuristic that is based on the widely-used ranked positional weight (RPW) rule. The example given by Ağp...

In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms re...