We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements. A natural rule in this setting is maximum weighted Nash welfare (MWNW) rule, which selects an allocation maximizing product agents’ utilities. show that when have binary valuations, a specific version MWNW resource- and population-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, ca...

In a combinatorial auction (CA) with item bidding, several goods are sold simultaneously via single-item auctions. We study how the equilibrium performance of such an auction depends on the choice of the underlying single-item auction. We provide a thorough understanding of the price of anarchy, as a function of the single-item auction payment rule. When the payment rule depends on the winner’s...

In this article renewable energy support allocation through different types of auctions are assessed. The applied methodological framework is auction theory, based on the rules governing German photovoltaic (PV) Feed-in Premium (FIP) auctions. work focuses bidding strategies an extended levelised cost electricity (LCOE) methodology, comparing two set rules: uniform price and pay-as-bid. When ca...

In the allocation of indivisible goods, maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as only within class additive welfarist rules that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. We extend this characterization all rules.

We consider boundedly rational learning processes in which players have a priori limited set of behavior rules. A behavior rule is a function from information to a stage-game action, which reflects the available information and one’s reasoning about how others act. Commonly used behavior rules include the adaptive rule and the conservative rule (inertia). Sophisticated players may use iterative...

The present article presents and discusses the recent controversy about the possibility and meaning of relating the game theoretic Nash program to mechanism theory. The non-cooperative foundation of the Nash bargaining solution is used as an example to shed light on the formal relation between traditional non-cooperative support of cooperative solutions and mechanism theoretic implementation of...

We specify an oligopoly game, where …rms choose quantity in order to maximise pro…ts, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rentseeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for in‡uence. Alternative speci…cations of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation.

We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player plays according to it, mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The strategy requires very little in terms of information about the game, as players’ actions are based only on their own past payoffs. Moreover, in a variant of the procedure, players need not know...

We specify an oligopoly game, where …rms choose quantity in order to maximise pro…ts, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rentseeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for in‡uence. Alternative speci…cations of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation.

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a str...