This paper studies how changes in oil supply expectations affect the price and macroeconomy. Using a novel identification design, exploiting institutional features of OPEC high-frequency data, I identify an news shock. These shocks have statistically economically significant effects. Negative leads to immediate increase prices, gradual fall production, inventories. has consequences for US econo...

Abstract I n this paper, the behavior of the real oil price and OPEC and non-OPEC oil production during 1973-2013 are modelled. Interactions among OPEC, non-OPEC oil production, global oil consumption, and the real price of crude oil are estimated using a Structural VAR model (SVAR). After providing evidence for the structural breaks in oil price in 1996, the results indicate that, ac...

We estimate models that identify the economic and organizational determinants of crude oil production by individual OPEC nations. To clarify the interpretation of econometric results, we model production with specifications that resolve the statistical ordering of variables and estimate models with techniques that can cope with stochastic trends in the time series. We also analyze the short-run...

Alternative market structures are distinguishable by the degree of parallel action exhibited by producers. We show that the correlation between output levels varies systematically with the degree of interdependence among firms, and establish an ordering among alternative behavioral hypotheses (Cournot, Stackelberg, Edgeworth/Bertrand, collusion, and perfect competition). Because the ordering is...

The world oil market is modelled as a two-person non-zero-sum game in normal form with each player having a continuum of strategies. The two players are the oil importing nations (OPIC) and the oil exporting nations (OPEC). The game is solved in the noncooperative sense using the equilibrium point solution concept due to Nash. The Nash equilibrium point solution yields an analytic expression fo...

in this paper, monopolistic behavior of opec, as the largest and most stable international organization between jan. 1973 to sep. 2008, is studied. for this purpose, fundamentals of game theory is used as a basis to come-up with a criterion to make a distinction between two market structures based on mutual dependency of institutions. then using such criterion, a regressive model based on expla...

This paper uses annual data on world oil price and consumption from 1965 to 2006 to calibrate a Hotelling model of optimal nonrenewable resource extraction. Numerical solutions are generated for various specifications of the elasticity of demand for both isoelastic demand and linear demand under each of two possible market structures: perfect competition and monopoly. Prior to the 1973 oil cris...

The energy shocks of the 1970's had significant effects on the global economy. Were they engineered by an effective cartel of OPEC members acting to share the market by controlling output and influencing market prices? If OPEC was an effective cartel sharing the market among its members, there would be a long-run relationship between each member's individual production and total OPEC output. On...

We study the relationship between banks’ size and risk-taking in context of supranational banking supervision. Consistently with theoretical work on unions contrast to analyses emphasising incentives underpinned by too-big-to-fail effect, we find an inverse non-performing loan growth for a sample European banks. Evidence is provided that mechanism operates through enhanced organisational effici...

I present a model of venture capital contracting in which contracts that involve a mixture of both debt and equity are efficient and dominate pure-equity and pure-debt financing. The optimal contract balances the venture capitalist’s incentive to intervene in the project and the entrepreneur’s desire for control. JEL classification: G24, G32