How do political institutions shape government size and redistributional policies? An empirical model proposes a possible framework to evaluate sign and magnitude of the relation. Political institutions are classified in complementary constraints, namely political competition, competition in executive recruitment and constraints on the executive. Results show that the stronger democratic instit...

In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians’ behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We derive the following results: i) Political competition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition f...

The purpose of this research is to explore information and analyze the political communication women's representation in North Sumatra Regional People's Representative Council for 2019-2024 period. This uses theory communication, women. was researched at Secretariat Province. method used study a qualitative analysis using inductive reasoning assessing every problem study. informants as subjects...

Why do national governments choose the monetary institutions they do? While this question has long interested political economists, previous literature on the topic suffers from a central limitation: the choices of exchange-rate regime and central bank independence (CBI) have been analyzed in isolation from one another. This is surprising given that prominent arguments from this literature port...

Article history: Received 14 November 2014 Received in revised form 20 May 2015 Accepted 21 May 2015 Available online 29 May 2015 This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and labour market institutions. We develop a theoretical model in which political instability creates incentives for a government to introduce labour market regulation in the economy. The distorti...

Formal political institutions have been assigned two roles in democratization theorizing: as contingent effects of strategic interaction and as predictable bases for democratic consolidation. These roles might be reconciled if we assume that institutions become persistent once in place. But patterns of behavior surrounding these institutions do not appear to conform to the expectations of path ...

Electoral systems are uniquely distributive political institutions that shape political outcomes, yet are themselves endogenously shaped outcomes of political choices. In Poland, party system development has involved not only parties adapting to electoral institutions in each election, but also parties modifying these institutions prior to every election. We model electoral system change as dri...

This paper examines the connection between people’s trust or cynicism in major U.S. institutions and their vote cast for President in the 2000 election. The absence of confidence and trust fuels cynicism, an attitude that may lead elites to exploit institutional resources and the public to withdraw their support from important institutions. We examined the 13 measures of confidence-trust in the...

Traditionally, political scientists define political institutions deductively. This approach may prevent from discovery of existing institutions beyond the definitions. Here, a principal component analysis was used for an inductive extraction of dimensions in Polity IV data on the political institutions of all nations in the world the last two centuries. Three dimensions of institutions were re...