Duopolies are one of the simplest economic situations where interactions between firms determine market behavior. The standard model a price-setting duopoly is Bertrand model, which has unique solution that both set their prices equal to costs—a paradoxical result obtain zero profit, generally not observed in real duopolies. Here we propose new game theory for duopoly, show resolves behavior an...

R policies are common in many sectors of retail distribution. Padmanabhan and Png (1997) showed that with demand uncertainty, a returns policy could improve manufacturer profitability under certain conditions. Wang (2004) showed that returns policies do not change manufacturer profitability when demand is certain and retailing is competitive. We show that returns policies do increase manufactur...

On the basis of domestic and foreign workers’ study, this paper considers the dynamic model of a duopoly price game in insurance market. In the duopoly model, we theoretically analyze the existence and stability of the Nash equilibrium point of the dynamic system, when one player or both players make a delayed decision, then stability conditions are obtained. The numerical simulation results fu...

In this paper, we develop a differentiated duopoly model with endogenous cost-reducing R&D and review the argument on welfare effect of price and quantity competition in the presence of technology licensing. We show that the standard conclusion on duopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984) can be completely reversed. Cournot competition induces lower R&D investment than Bertrand competition does. Moreover...

The aim of the paper is to study the Bertrand duopoly example in the quantum domain. We use two ways to write the game in terms of quantum theory. The first one adapts the Li-Du-Massar scheme for the Cournot duopoly. The second one is a simplified model that exploits a two qubit entangled state. In both cases we focus on finding Nash equilibria in the resulting games.

We develop a price competition model for a new supply chain that competes in a market comprised of some rival supply chains. The new supply chain has one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer in which the manufacturer is a leader and retailer is a follower. The manufacturer pays a fraction of the risk cost (caused by demand uncertainty) to the retailer. We apply this competitiv...

In this paper, we analyze entry and exit decisions in a symmetric duopoly setting. The model is based on Dixit (1989), which is a standard model in this area. To incorporate competitive nature into the output price, we use an inverse demand function. We aim to present an equilibrium strategy of entry and exit decisions in a symmetric duopoly. To do so, we consider four states of two firms and p...