Coalitional game deals with situations that involve cooperations among players, and there are different solution concepts such as the core,the Shapley value and the kernel. In many situations, there is no way to predict the payoff functions except for the expert experiencesand subjective intuitions, which leads to the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. Within the framework of credibility theo...

Designing fair compensation mechanisms for demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value. As exact computation of the Shapley Value is in general intractable, we propose estimating it using a reinforcement learning algorithm that approximates optimal stratified sampling. We a...

Hamiache’s recent axiomatization of the well-known Shapley value for TU games states that the Shapley value is the unique solution verifying the following three axioms: the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. Driessen extended Hamiache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important...

This paper shows a new axiomatization of the Shapley value by using two axioms. First axiom is Dummy Player Property and second axiom is Strong Addition Invariance. Strong Addition Invariance states that the payoff vector of a game does not change even if we add some specific games to the game. By slightly changing the definition of Strong Addition Invariance, we can also axiomatize the weighte...

We suggest a new game-theory-based ranking method for wines, in which the Shapley Value of each wine is computed, and wines are ranked according to their Shapley Values. Judges should find it simpler to use, since they are not required to rank order or grade all the wines, but merely to choose the group of those that they find meritorious. Our ranking method is based on the set of reasonable ax...