Due to its sensitive nature, tax compliance is difficult to study empirically, and valid information on tax evasion is rare. More specifically, when directly asked on surveys, respondents are likely to underreport their evasion behavior. Such invalid responses not only bias prevalence estimates but may also obscure associations with individual predictors. To generate more valid estimates of tax...

We analyze the evolution and extent of income tax evasion under alternative governmental policies in an agent-based model with heterogeneous agents. A novel aspect of our modeling is the use of an exponential utility function, which allows us to assume rather realistic audit probabilities and to yield more realistic results with respect to the extent of tax evasion. Further, the introduction of...

This study aims to design a model to realize real estate income tax in Tabriz city with due attention to the tax collection process. According to the related literature, the variables of "tax payment," "real estate," "tax evasion," "investment incentive," "rent and real estate speculation," and "advertisement in tax collection" are considered as key variables, affecting the conceptual model of ...

In a survey of Australian citizens (valid N = 1,406), personal and social norms were found to moderate effects of deterrence on tax evasion. Personal, internalized norms of tax honesty were negatively related to tax evasion and moderated the effects of deterrence variables (i.e., sanction severity), suggesting deterrence effects only when individual ethics were weak. Perceived social norms, bey...

Tax evasion is modeled as a risky activity and integrated into a standard problem of optimal tax design. It is shown that there is a trade off between reducing tax evasion and reducing tax distortion. Thus it is efficient to supplement a broad-based wage tax by a tax on specific consumption if the former is evaded and the latter not. The optimal tax structure can be characterized by an explicit...

In this paper, we examine the distributional effects of tax evasion, using results from theoretical, experimental, empirical, and especially the general equilibrium literatures on tax evasion. Much – if not all – of this evidence concludes that the main beneficiaries of successful tax evasion are the tax evaders themselves, with distributional effects that largely favor higher income individual...

In this paper, we examine the distributional effects of tax evasion, using results from theoretical, experimental, empirical, and especially the general equilibrium literatures on tax evasion. Much – if not all – of this evidence concludes that the main beneficiaries of successful tax evasion are the tax evaders themselves, with distributional effects that largely favor higher income individual...

We embed the behaviour of tax evasion into the standard two-dimensional Ising model. In the presence of an external magnetic field, the Ising model is able to generate the empirically observed effect of tax morale, i.e. the phenomenon that in some countries tax evasion is either rather high or low. The external magnetic field captures the agents’ trust in governmental institutions. We also find...

This paper models a capital-exporting country that encounters difficulties in taxing foreignsource income, due to tax evasion problems. The paper compares the country’s optimal effective tax rates on the income from capital invested at home and abroad (including penalties levied on detected tax evaders). It finds that tax evasion abroad does not provide a justification for a relatively low effe...