We first provide the complete characterization of mechanisms that satisfy weak group strategy-proofness and queue-efficiency in the multiple machine queueing problem with two agents. For any such mechanism, there can be at most one point of discontinuity in the transfer map. We then state a necessary condition for mechanisms to satisfy queue-efficiency, weak group strategy-proofness and continu...

We study manipulability of multi-valued solutions in fair allocation of homogeneous indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We show that the no-envy solution satis…es some extension of strategy-proofness to multi-valued solutions. Since no-envy implies Pareto e¢ ciency in this literature, this result implies that we can escape many impossibility results on strategy-proofness by allowing a ...

We formulate and study the requirement on an allocation rule that no agent should be able to benefit by augmenting his endowment through borrowing resources from the outside world (alternatively, by simply exaggerating it). We show that the Walrasian rule is not “borrowing-proof” even on standard domains. More seriously, no efficient selection from the endowments-lower-bound correspondence, or ...

I introduce a concept of D(k)-proofness which says that a rule is nonmanipulable by the false preference relations within k distance from the sincere one. I prove that for every rule defined over all weak orders, strategyproofness is equivalent to D(k)-proofness if and only if k ≥ m − 1, where m is the number of the alternatives.

We present some results on social welfare function and social choice function. First, we replace weak Pareto principle of Arrow’s axioms with strong Pareto principle, and then show that assuming unrestricted domain property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and strong Pareto principle on a social welfare function in Arrow’s sense leads to the existence of first to nth commanders whose st...

We study the problem of allocating objects by means of probabilistic mechanisms. Each agent has strict preferences over objects and ex post receives exactly one object. A standard approach in the literature is to extend agents' preferences over objects to preferences over lotteries de ned on those objects, using the rst-order stochastic dominance criterion, or the sd-extension. In a departure f...

ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for

The lemmas in Appendix C.2 show how requirements R1–R6 are driven by group strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency. The following examples further illustrate the role of the consistency requirements R4–R6. Requirement R4 is needed to ensure the individual strategy-proofness of the TC mechanisms. This requirement is also needed to ensure the individual strategyproofness of the TTC mechanisms, a...