We develop a simple macroeconomic model where the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to tax distortions. If fiscal policy is exogenously fixed at its optimal level, a Walsh contract (Walsh, 1995) offered to an independent central bank implements the optimal monetary policy. When fiscal policy is determined endogenously, however, this contract is subject to strategic manipulati...

This paper evaluates the interacted effects of the fiscal and monetary policies on the nominal and real macro-variables of the Iranian economy. Our analysis is thus based on the optimal control theory by which the optimal path of the control variables including monetary and fiscal tools are determined over the period 1963-2006. We also use a macro-econometric model in form of a simultaneous equ...

In this section, we briefly explore some issues surrounding the interactions between monetary policy and fiscal policy. In developed countries, monetary-policy-setting is effectively “independent” from fiscal-policy-setting, in the sense that separate authorities control the two types of policy-making. For example, Federal Reserve policy-makers are not the same as Congressional policy-makers. E...

This paper provides an empirical exploration of the interaction between fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rates, and external balances as well as their impacts on real economic growth and inflation for the BRICS countries. A panel VAR model is employed to assess the dynamic relationships. Our results generally confirm the significant impacts of a monetary shock on real economic activity ...

In the absence of government commitment, the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy depends on the sign of inherited net nominal government obligations. When these obligations are negative, monetary policy is non-distortionary and fiscal policy distortions are smoothed over time, either forever or for a finite number of periods, depending on the initial state. For positive net nominal government...

We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, inflation conservatism causes fiscal overspending. But if fiscal policy is determined before monetary ...

Using an estimated DSGE model that features monetary and fiscal policy interactions and allows for equilibrium indeterminacy, we find that a passive monetary and passive fiscal policy regime prevailed in the pre-Volcker period while an active monetary and passive fiscal policy regime prevailed post-Volcker. Since both monetary and fiscal policies were passive pre-Volcker, there was equilibrium ...