We characterize which scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic for each social choice problem as a function of the number of agents and the number of alternatives. We show that a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it satisfies a certain unanimity condition. Since scoring rules are neutral, Maskin-monotonicity turns out to be equivalent to Nash-implementability within the class of scoring...

We first propose a general game-theoretic framework for studying engineering systems consisting of interacting (sub)systems. Our framework enables us to capture the delays often present in engineering systems as well as asynchronous operations of systems. We model the interactions among the systems using a repeated game and provide a new simple learning rule for the players representing the sys...

This paper studies action-based reinforcement learning in finite perfectioninformation games. Restrictions on the valuation updating rule that guarantee that the play eventually converges to a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) are identified. These conditions are mild enough to contain interesting and plausible learning behavior. We provide two examples of such updating rule that suggest ...

This paper compares two decision rules available to myopic players who are repeatedly randomly matched to play a 2 x 2 symmetric game. Players using the simple decision rule evaluate the strategies by comparing their current payoffs to those of an opponent currently playing the other strategy, while those following the clever decision rule assess the strategies under the assumption that opponen...

Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2× 2 game such as Matching Pennies. Between matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a finite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals from the same population follow the same behavioral rule. In the resulting discrete time dynamics the unique ...

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent’s payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if the player does not condition his strategy on the opponent’s actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a simple class of radically uncoupled learning rules, patterned after aspiration learning models, whose period-byperiod behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium...

Hex is a classic board game invented in the middle of the twentieth century by Piet Hein and rediscovered later by John Nash. The best Hex artificial players analyse the board positions by deducing complex virtual connections from elementary connections using the H-Search algorithm. In this paper, we extend the H-search with a new deduction rule. This new deduction rule is capable of discoverin...

This paper addresses the following issue: If a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives 'in the shadow' of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a 'winning coalition' supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: What in uence can the voting rule used to settle (possibly nonunanimous) agreements have on the outcome of consensus? We m...

A social welfare function entitled ‘ordinal Nash’ is proposed. It is based on risk preferences and assumes a common, worst social tate (origin) for all individuals. The crucial axiom in the characterization of the function is a weak version of independence of rrelevant alternatives. This axiom considers relative risk positions with respect to the origin. Thus, the resulting social preference ak...