This paper introduces a dynamic model of the stochastic repayment behavior exhibited by delinquent credit-card accounts. Based on this model, we construct a dynamic collectability score (DCS) which estimates the account-specific probability of collecting a given portion of the outstanding debt over any given time horizon. The model integrates a variety of information sources, including historic...

How do borrowers respond to improvements a lender’s ability to punish defaulters? We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining the impact of fingerprinting of borrowers, which improves the lender’s ability to withhold future loans from individuals who have previously defaulted. Study participants were smallholder farmers applying for agricultural input loans, and were random...

Recent evidence suggests heterogenous impacts of microfinance loans, with limited average effects on enterprise growth among the poor. One possibility is that the rigidity of the classic microcredit contract – widely held to be important for reducing default – inhibits investment in microenterprises. To explore these trade-offs, we provide experimental estimates of the consequences for client r...

Farmers use credit from commercial credit providers to finance production activities. Commercial credit providers have to predict the financial sustainability of the enterprise to ensure that the borrower will have the ability to repay the loan. A Delphi study was conducted to explore what factors are used as indicators of loan-repayment ability of farmers. The objective was not only to identif...

Given the substantial amount of resources currently invested in microcredit programs, it is more important than ever to accurately assess the extent to which peer monitoring by borrowers faced with group liability contracts actually reduces moral hazard. We conduct a field experiment with women about to enter a group loan program in Paraguay and then gather administrative data on their repaymen...

This paper examines the impact of a public credit registry on the repayment behavior of borrowers. We implement an experimental credit market in which loan repayment is not third-party enforceable. We compare market outcome with a credit registry to that without a credit registry. This experiment is conducted for two market environments: first a market in which interactions between borrowers an...

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model for debt repayment behaviors of new customers in the credit card market. We treat customer decisions of whether to be delinquent or not and of how much to pay conditional on deciding not to be delinquent as two separate but possibly correlated decisions and thus view the amount repaid by a delinquent consumer as a censored observation. We assume that th...

This paper looks at the problem of endowment assurances which do not meet their targets to repay residential mortgages. Through the analysis of the present value of payments under different inflation and interest-rate regimes, we conclude that the perceived problems with endowment policies may simply be a manifestation of "money illusion". Nevertheless, there could frictional problems and other...