We propose generic declarative definitions of individual and collective trust relations between interacting agents and agent collections, and trust domains of trust-related agents in distributed systems. Our definitions yield (1) (in)compatibility, implicational, and transitivity results for trust relationships, including a Datalog-implementability result for their logical structure; (2) comput...

We argue that a general theory of trust in networks of humans and computers must be build on both a theory of behavioral trust and a theory of computational trust. This argument is motivated by increased participation of people in social networking, crowdsourcing, human computation, and socio-economic protocols, e.g., protocols modeled by trust and gift-exchange games [3, 10, 11], norms-establi...

We argue that a general theory of trust in networks of humans and computers must be build on both a theory of behavioral trust and a theory of computational trust. This argument is motivated by increased participation of people in social networking, crowdsourcing, human computation, and socio-economic protocols, e.g., protocols modeled by trust and gift-exchange games [3, 10, 11], norms-establi...

Trust as a concept and empirical measure has attracted significant attention in economic theory and research within the last two decades. However, gaps remain in our understanding of what exactly is measured by the different experimental and survey measures of trust, and how they relate to each other. In this paper, we demonstrate that the commonly used trust game captures trust in strangers, b...

Trust as a concept and empirical measure has attracted significant attention in economic theory and research within the last two decades. However, gaps remain in our understanding of what exactly is measured by the different experimental and survey measures of trust, and how they relate to each other. In this paper, we demonstrate that the commonly used trust game captures trust in strangers, b...

We analyze the determinants of trust and trustworthiness in a matching equilibrium when agents have heterogeneous predispositions towards trusting and trustworthy behavior, there is transmission of information via both individual and collective reputations, and successful matches may persist. In new matches, more social trustworthiness breeds more individual trust. However, whether more social ...