A weighted-voting mechanism is presented in which agents are able to jointly decide on plan repair proposals in the airport traffic control domain. The mechanism uses Clarke Tax for incentive compatible bidding. It provides a slider value by which an airport can control the balance between optimality and fairness of plan repair solutions. Special care is taken to ensure that agents have no ince...

Based on the wide application of relevant classical and modern economic thoughts, this paper analyzed the implications of price discovery and competition, compared the market auto adjustment mechanism and the government control of economy, explored market failure and price distortion, and drew the conclusion of the necessity of market mechanism design which is especially helpful for the reform ...

Service providers lease bandwidth from owners of individual links to form desired routes. Bandwidth is leased in indivisible amounts, say multiples of 100 Mbps. We study the interaction between buyers and sellers of bandwidth. Within a conventional market, we showed in [8] that a competitive equilibrium exists if agents’ utilities are linear in bandwidth (and money) and they truthfully reveal t...

We propose a model to describe stock pinning on option expiration dates. We argue that if the open interest on a particular contract is unusually large, delta-hedging in aggregate by floor market-makers can impact the stock price and drive it to the strike price of the option. We derive a stochastic differential equation for the stock price which has a singular drift that accounts for the price...

Abstract: In this paper, a two-dimensional Cournot model is proposed to study generation companies’ (GENCO’s) strategic quantity-setting behaviors in the newly established Yunnan’s electricity market. A hybrid pricing mechanism is introduced to Yunnan’s electricity market with the aim to stimulate electricity demand. Market equilibrium is obtained by iteratively solving each GENCO’s profit maxi...

This paper addresses the possibility of capacity withholding by energy producers, who seek to increase the market price and their own profits. The energy market is simulated as an iterative game, where each state game corresponds to an hourly energy auction with uniform pricing mechanism. The producers are modeled as agents that interact with their environment through reinforcement learning (RL...

In this paper, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We define a formal market model that specifies the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of market mechanisms. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with...

Competing mechanism games can have many equilibrium outcomes when mechanism designers can use mechanisms which ask agents to report deviations. Existing folk theorems assume agents have perfect information about designers’ mechanisms, that they can costlessly convey very complex messages, and that they use weakly dominated strategies. This paper addresses two questions. The first is whether the...