We present a distributed learning algorithm for optimizing transit prices in the inter-domain routing framework. We present a combined game theoretical and distributed algorithmic analysis, where the notion of Nash equilibrium with the first approach meets the notion of stability in the second. We show that providers can learn how to strategically set their prices according to a Nash equilibriu...

We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at mos...

Nonalcoholic fatty liver disease (NAFLD) is prevalent in 20-25% of the general population and is associated with metabolic risk factors such as obesity, diabetes mellitus, and dyslipidemia. Histologically, NAFLD ranges from simple steatosis to nonalcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH), fibrosis, and cirrhosis. As NASH develops in only 10-15% of patients with NAFLD, it is not practical to biopsy all p...

Nash equilibrium is based on the idea that a strategy profile is stable if no player can benefit from a unilateral deviation. We observe that some locally rational deviations in a strategic form game may not be profitable anymore if one takes into account the possibility of further deviations by the other players. As a solution, we propose the concept of farsighted pre-equilibrium, which takes ...

This paper is concerned with the following problem. In a bounded rational game where players cannot be as super-rational as in Kalai and Leher (1993), are there simple adaptive heuristics or rules that can be used in order to secure convergence to Nash equilibria, or convergence only to a larger set designated by correlated equilibria? Are there games with uncoupled deterministic dynamics in di...

In this paper, we study the design of core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions (CAs), a challenging setting where no strategyproof rules exist. We observe that in many real-world CAs, bidders are heterogeneous in size and value. Unfortunately, the rule most commonly used in practice, the Quadratic rule (Day and Cramton, 2012), significantly favors large over small bidders in term...

A central problem for the game theoretic analysis of voting is that voting games have very many Nash equilibria. In this paper, we consider a new refinement concept for voting games that combines two ideas that appear reasonable for voting games: First, trembling hand perfection (voters sometimes make mistakes when casting their vote) and second, coordination of voters with similar interests. W...

Usual models of search markets describe the equilibrium pricing strategies of sellers confronted to a population of buyers searching for the best deal: in equilibrium, a seller perfectly anticipates both the pricing strategy of his rivals and the search behaviour of buyers, and optimally responds to it. We show in this paper that “less rational” sellers are not able to learn this Nash-equilibri...

We examine problems of placing facilities in a tree graph to serve customers. The decision of placement is driven by an election process amongst the users, where the user preference is modeled by distances in the tree. Relaxed user preferences introduce a tolerance of users against small di erences in distances. Monotonous gain functions are introduced to provide general results of which well k...

We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.