In this paper the Borda rule is extended by allowing the voters to show their preferences among alternatives through linguistic labels. To this aim, we need to add them up for assigning a qualification to each alternative and then to compare such qualifications. Theoretically, all these assessments and comparisons fall into a totally ordered commutative monoid generated by the initial set of li...

In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomial-time approximation schemes) as well as obtain inapproximability results. In particular, we show that a large subclass of scoring protocols admits fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for the coalitional weight...

A society facing a choice problem has also to choose the voting rule itself from a set of different possible voting rules. In such situations, the consequentialism property allows us to induce voters’ preferences on voting rules from preferences over alternatives. A voting rule employed to resolve the society’s choice problem is self-selective if it chooses itself when it is also used in choosi...

In this paper, we evaluate some techniques for the time series similarity searching. Many distance measures have been proposed as alternatives to the Euclidean distance in the similarity searching. To verify the assumption that the combination of various similarity measures may produce more accurate similarity searching results, we propose an multi-measure algorithm to combine several measures ...

This paper proposes a grey interval relation TOPSIS for the decision making in which all of the attribute weights and attribute values are given by the interval grey numbers. The feature of our method different from other grey relation decision-making is that all of the subjective and objective weights are obtained by interval grey number and that decisionmaking is performed based on the relati...

[Slinko and White, 2008] have recently introduced a new model of coalitional manipulation of voting rules under limited communication, which they call safe strategic voting. The computational aspects of this model were first studied by [Hazon and Elkind, 2010], who provide polynomial-time algorithms for finding a safe strategic vote under kapproval and the Bucklin rule. In this paper, we answer...

We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule. Howev...

Weighted committee games generalize n-player simple voting games to m ≥ 3 alternatives. The committee’s aggregation rule treats votes anonymously but parties, shareholders, members of supranational organizations, etc. differ in their numbers of votes. Infinitely many vote distributions induce only finitely many distinct mappings from preference profiles to winners, i.e., non-equivalent committe...

We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying qualified majority property for any given threshold. also spcs minimal property. next evaluate probability that Borda, plurality and antiplurality fulfil two aforementioned properties under Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption in presence of three four alternatives various sizes society. Our results show Borda s...

Nowadays, Barton’s Joint Roughness Coefficients (JRC) are widely used as the index for roughness and as a challenging fracture property. When JRC ranking is the goal, deriving JRC from different fractal/wavelet procedures can be conflicting. Complexity increases when various rankings outcome from different calculation methods. Therefore, using Barton’s JRC, we cannot make a decision based on th...