We investigate manipulation of the Borda voting rule, as well as two elimination style voting rules, Nanson’s and Baldwin’s voting rules, which are based on Borda voting. We argue that these rules have a number of desirable computational properties. For unweighted Borda voting, we prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute a manipulation. This resolves a long-standi...

We provide a natural extension of the Borda count to the n-dimensional spatial context, an algorithm to find the spatial Borda winner based on the notion of an inverse Borda count, the result that the Borda winner and the Condorcet winner coincide in unidimensional space when all alternatives on a line are feasible, results that show that in multi-dimensional space the Borda winner and the Cond...

We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form of two new greedy manipulation algorithms based on intuitions from the bin-packing and multiprocessor scheduling domains. Although we have not been able to show that these algorithms beat existing methods in the worst-c...

This paper describes the WSD system developed for our participation to the SemEval-1. It combines various methods by means of a fuzzy Borda voting. The fuzzy Borda votecounting scheme is one of the best known methods in the field of collective decision making. In our system the different disambiguation methods are considered as experts that give a preference ranking for the senses a word can be...

The question addressed in this paper is the order of magnitude of the difference between the Borda rule and any given social choice function. A social choice function is a mapping that associates a subset of alternatives to any profile of individual preferences. The Borda rule consists in asking voters to order all alternatives, knowing that the last one in their ranking will receive a score of...

Indicators system of China’s computer manufacturing enterprises of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen can be established to reflect the efficiency of production, which accord to the number of employees, fixed assets and other economic data. Integrated data envelopment analysis (DEA) models are used, combining with evaluation and statistical tests of Synthetic Average method, Borda method...

Recent research reveals that many NP-hard voting problems in general become polynomial-time solvable in single-peaked elections. In contrast to these results, we prove for the first time that constructive control by adding/deleting votes for Borda are NP-hard even in single-peaked elections. On the other side, we prove that constructive control by adding/deleting votes/candidates for Borda are ...

We prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute how to manipulate the Borda voting rule. This resolves one of the last open problems in the computational complexity of manipulating common voting rules. Because of this NP-hardness, we treat computing a manipulation as an approximation problem where we try to minimize the number of manipulators. Based on ideas from bin ...