This paper is devoted to sequential decision making with Rank Dependent expected Utility (RDU). criterion generalizes Expected and enables model a wider range of observed (rational) behaviors. In such setting, two conflicting objectives can be identified in the assessment strategy: maximizing performance viewed from initial state (optimality), minimizing incentive deviate during implementation ...

We analyze an equilibrium concept called revision-proofness for infinite-horizon games played by a dynasty of players. Revision-proofness requires strategies to be robust to joint deviations by multiple players and is a refinement of sub-game perfection. Sub-game perfect paths that can only be sustained by reversion to paths with payoffs below those of an alternative path are not revision-proof...

ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms . . . 141 Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto Vasconcelos

We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite's (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the resul...

There are many situations where the indifference classes of the agents’ preferences are exogenously given. We present a framework for dealing with such situations and find that the cardinality of the set S, which consists of alternatives that every agent ranks strictly, is critical to the construction of a strategyproof social choice function; if |S| ≥ 3, then strategy-proofness implies dictato...

We consider the problem of dividing a non-homogeneous onedimensional continuum whose endpoints are identified. Examples are the division of a birthday cake, the partition of a circular market, the assignment of sentry duty or medical call. We study the existence of rules satisfying various requirements of fairness (no-envy, egalitarianequivalence; and several requirements having to do with chan...

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. Wefirst show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. Wenext prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strateg...

In response to the judgement-proofness problem many countries consider the extension of liability for environmental damages to lenders to wealth-constrained, environmentally risky businesses. We analyze a simple model of vicarious liability and show that using the deep pockets of lenders for liability enhances safety only if the lender has high bargaining power when bargaining with a ̄rm about ...