For about three decades, artificial intelligence has been concerned with a debate on the adequacy of probability for treating uncertainty. The transferable belief model is an alternative framework that resulted from that debate. The peculiarity of the transferable belief model is its dichotomical structure in which a non-Bayesian knowledge representation co-exists with a Bayesian de-

In (McCarthy and Hayes 1969), we proposed dividing the artificial intelligence problem into two parts—an epistemological part and a heuristic part. This lecture further explains this division, explains some of the epistemological problems, and presents some new results and approaches. The epistemological part of AI studies what kinds of facts about the world are available to an observer with gi...

This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are often missed in discussions of epistemological arguments against realism. Then I define the target of the argument — non-causal realism — ...

There is an epistemological crisis in genomics. At issue is what constitutes scientific knowledge in genomic science, or systems biology in general. Does this crisis require a new perspective on knowledge heretofore absent from science or is it merely a matter of interpreting new scientific developments in an existing epistemological framework? This paper discusses the manner in which the exper...

An epistemological case is made for how single subject psychotherapy research provides unique and untapped opportunities for generating and generalizing scientific knowledge about psychotherapy. The epistemological claim asserts that it is essential that problem and method be aligned in psychotherapy research. Examples of misalignment in experimental and correlational contexts are given and the...

This article takes up the issue of the plausibility of epistemological theories of consciousness: accounts of the so-called " hard problem " of phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers 1996) that are rooted in physicalistic explanations of what we know and how we know it. Such accounts elaborate how physical systems come to (perceptually) know their physical environments and show how perceivers may c...