Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the...

This study extends from Liu and Mei (1992) by further investigation of assets, real estate related securities, which includes both equity and mortgage real estate investment trusts (REITs), the stocks of builderand owner-companies, and mortgagebacked securities (MBSs). There are five major findings. First, expected excess returns of real estate related securities are more predictable than the e...

The energy markets of today are markets with rather few active participants. The participants are, with few exceptions, large producers and distributors. The market mechanisms that are used are constructed with this kind of a market situation in mind. With an automatic or semiautomatic approach, the market mechanism would be able to incorporate a larger number of participants. Smaller producers...

In a model with endogenous number of innovating firms, we show that whether patent protection increases R&D investment is ambiguous, and depends on the market demand function and the cost of R&D. If the market size increases with number of firms, patent protection reduces R&D investment if the cost of R&D is sufficiently high, and higher product differentiation increases the possibility of lowe...

This paper presents the case for and the evidence in favour of passive investment strategies and examines the major criticisms of the technique. I conclude that the evidence strongly supports passive investment management in all markets—smallcapitalisation stocks as well as large-capitalisation equities, US markets as well as international markets, and bonds as well as stocks. Recent attacks on...

In this paper we introduce two models of opinion dynamics in oligopoly markets and apply them to a situation, where a new entrant challenges two incumbents of the same size. The models differ in the way the two forces influencing consumer choice – (local) social interactions and (global) advertising – interact. We study the general behavior of the models using the Mean Field Approach and Monte ...