Many philosophers use “physicalism” and “naturalism” interchangeably. In this paper, I will distinguish ontological naturalism from physicalism. While broad versions of physicalism are compatible with naturalism, naturalism doesn't have to be committed to strong versions of physical reductionism, so it cannot be defined as equivalent to it. Instead of relying on the notion of ideal physics, nat...

Many philosophers have been attracted by the view that colors are mindindependent properties of object surfaces. A leading, and increasingly popular, version of this view that has been defended in recent years is the so-called physicalist position that identifies colors with (classes of) spectral reflectance distributions. This view, has, however, come in for a fair bit of criticism for failing...

In the context of theories of the connection between mind and brain, physicalism is the demand that all is basically purely physical. But the conception of “physical” embodied in this demand is characterized essentially by the properties of the physical that hold in classical physical theories. Certain of those properties contradict the character of the physical in quantum mechanics, which prov...

Modern science has undermined belief in countless imaginary causalities. What is the nature of the relation between mind and brain? Philosophers have debated the issue for millennia, but it is only in the last twenty years that empirical evidence has begun to uncover some of the secrets of this ancient riddle. This lecture explores the possiblity that advances in neuroscience will undermine and...

In his book Psychoneural Reduction – The New Wave John Bickle takes up a question that indeed deserved fresh consideration for quite some time – the question of whether psychology can be reduced to neurobiology. Of course, Bickle is right. In the last twenty years the general debate about the concept of theory reduction led to a lot of new insights. It should have been natural to reconsider the...

David Chalmers’ conceivability argument against physicalism relies on the entailment from a priori conceivability to metaphysical possibility. The a posteriori physicalist rejects this premise, but is consequently committed to psychophysical strong necessities. These don’t fit into the Kripkean model of the necessary a posteriori, and they are therefore, according to Chalmers, problematic. But ...

The next version to excite attention took off from the idea that, while mental terms cannot be translated into physical terms (as Carnap’s program had required) nevertheless, it does not follow that these terms refer to non-physical states. So, it was proposed, mental phenomena can be identical with states and processes in the brain, even though psychological descriptions have meanings differen...

According to the so-called Hempel’s Dilemma, thesis of physicalism is either false or empty. Our intention in this paper not propose a solution but rather argue as follows: extent that Dilemma applies it equally any theory gives deep-structure and changeable account our experience high-level theories. In particular, we will show also mind–body dualistic The scope turns out be very wide: special...