This paper describes a version of type identity physicalism, which we call Flat Physicalism, and shows how it meets several objections often raised against theories. theory is informed by recent results in the conceptual foundations physics, particular clarifies notion ‘physical kinds' light analysis paradigmatic case reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. We show Physicalism compati...

The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the ...

Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature concerns how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are cons...

Debates about the metaphysical compatibility between miracles and natural laws often appear to prejudge the issue by either adopting or rejecting a strong physicalist thesis (the idea that the physical is all that exists). The operative component of physicalism is a causal closure principle: that every caused event is a physically caused event. If physicalism and this strong causal closure prin...

Abstract In this paper, I discuss a view proposed by Carl Hempel in his paper Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets, published 1969. Here, suggested that questions regarding the identification of mental states with physiological states, relation between sociological phenomena individual behavioral biological physicochemical should be given what he calls ‘linguistic’ interpretation. His m...

This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent pro...

Abstract I define two metaphysical positions that anti-physicalists can take in response to Jonathan Schaffer’s ground functionalism. Ground functionalism is a version of physicalism where explanatory gaps are everywhere. If true, arguments against based on the gap between physical and experiential facts fail. In response, first, argue some already safe from challenge. These reject an underlyin...

Among the arguments that have been proposed for physicalism, “causal argument” is widely taken to be most compelling. Justin Tiehen (2015) has raised an interesting objection this argument takes form of a dilemma. Tiehen’s ultimate conclusion at best, causal circular and so its premises cannot provide support conclusion, physicalism. The aim present paper respond in order defense argument.