Consider a symmetric 2-player game of complete information. Consider an arbitrary Bayesian extension of that game with payoff-irrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity (private types). We show that, in this setting, while strategies in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game can differ across types, aggregate play in any such equilibrium must coincide with a symmetric Nash e...

We model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially-correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling raise significantly above static complete Nash levels even when the privately observed variables are restricted lie in narrow ranges. calibrate our using data from beer industr...

Suppose an unpredictable evader is free to move around in a polygonal environment of arbitrary complexity that is under full camera surveillance. How many pursuers, each with the same maximum speed as the evader, are necessary and sufficient to guarantee a successful capture of the evader? The pursuers always know the evader's current position through the camera network, but need to physically ...

Nowadays, public–private partnership projects have become a standard for delivering public services in both developed and developing countries. In this paper, we are concerned with the analysis of private sector proposals and the selection of the private sector partner to whom to award the contract. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been addressed within a game theory framework...

A language game is a communication game in which players are uncertain about each other’s ability to produce and interpret messages. We consider two types of language games, public-announcement games and pre-play communication games. A public-announcement game is a finite static complete-information game, the base game, preceded by the observation of a public signal, interpreted as an announcem...

The solution is given here for the infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum,games of inr complete information characterized by 2 X 2 games, with information matrxces b for the ftrst game and( b ab)for the second game.