The rate of technological progression seems to have encouraged teachers and researchers to reassess their pedagogic beliefs in an attempt to maintain their control over the learning process and the influx of authentic materials. With regard to the field of language teaching, technology seems to be demanding a re-examination of pedagogies in order to find ways of making use of current technology...

The paper describes a learner corpus of Czech, currently under development. The corpus captures Czech as used by nonnative speakers. We discuss its structure, the layered annotation of errors and the annotation process.

In this lecture we will start to look at the multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, which can be viewed as a form of online learning in which the learner receives only partial information at the end of each trial. Specifically, in an n-armed bandit problem, there are n different options that can be chosen, or n different arms that can be pulled, on each trial; each of these arms, when pulled, genera...

Multi-instance multi-label learning (MIML) is a learning paradigm where an object is represented by a bag of instances and each bag is associated with multiple labels. Ordinary MIML setting assumes a fixed target label set. In real applications, multiple novel labels may exist outside this set, but hidden in the training data and unknown to the MIML learner. Existing MIML approaches are unable ...

Antonio Donini, “Humanitarian Agenda 0 5: Principles, Power, and Perceptions. Afghanistan Case Study,” Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, available at http://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Humanitarian+Agenda+2015 --Afghanistan+Country+Study. The Feinstein International Center develops and promotes operational and policy responses to protect and strengthen the lives a...

We analyze a dynamic model of agenda formation in which players compete in each period to place their ideal policies on the agenda. In each period, with some probability, a decision maker takes an action from the agenda. We show that in any markov equilibrium of this game, players with extreme ideal policies will always compete to be in the agenda. On the other hand, there is a positive probabi...